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CHAPTER 11 
Aristotle’s Explanations of Monstrous Births and Deformities  
in Generation of Animals 4.4 
Sophia Connell 
 
1. Introduction 
In GA 4.4, Aristotle begins an account of various different kinds of monstrosities and 
deformities. One might think it pretty straightforward, from previous experience with 
his writings, that he would very little to offer here in terms of scientific explanation. 
Monsters do not occur always or for the most part, but infrequently. Surely by being 
contrary to nature, they are the result of luck or chance (Phys. 2.5, 196b10-17, Meta. 
5.30, 1025a14-16), which are accidental rather than per se causes and so not properly 
explanatory (Phys. 2.5, 197a33). Furthermore, rare event are associated with incidental 
ones and it is not possible to know about incidental matters (Phys. 2.5, 197a19-20, 
Meta. 6.2, 1027a19-23, and APo 1.30, 87b19-27). The detailed account that we find in 
GA 4.4 shows Aristotle attempting to explain why monstrous and deformed animals 
occur, and so seems to count as explanations in the realm of his science, broadly 
construed. Is there any way to provide a properly scientific explanation of why 
sometimes monsters come to be?  In this essay, I argue that scientific knowledge of 
monsters is not possible. As with other chance events, two separate causal stories can 
be used to further elucidate what happens,1 but there cannot be any per se causes of 
monsters. Given this, it is then perhaps surprising that Aristotle spends so long on 
monsters and related deformities. In what follows I will set out the account in some 
detail and show that, although there can be no scientific demonstration or knowledge of 
monsters, there are many recognizable elements of scientific explanation in GA 4.4. 
What happens in cases of monsters and deformities occurs in the process of generation, 
and there is much that we can know scientifically about this process—working from the 
animal’s essential attributes outward to factors that influence these processes. In 
particular, we find Aristotle looking for and investigating whether “for the most part” 
(FMP) correlations are causally relevant and linked to essence. Even though the birth of 
monsters is scientifically inexplicable, the features of animals that tend to produce them 
                                                          
1 As in the case of a man who meets a creditor by chance in the market (Phys. 2.5, 197a16-24). 
 
 
can be known about. I will explain how it is that producing more than one offspring per 
birth is a knowable feature of a kind. This feature, along with others, can then give us a 
much better grasp on what happens in particular instances of monstrous birth.    
I will begin by setting out some of the explanatory machinery that Aristotle must 
have in mind as he approaches the challenge of giving an account of monsters and 
individual deformed animals in GA 4.4. I will then give an overview of what he says 
about three key types of problem birth—monsters which are two animals grown 
together, deformities that involve redundancy of parts, and deformities that involve 
deficiency of parts. I will finally more closely consider three aspects of this account that 
can help us to assess its scientific merits: Aristotle’s use of regularity, his search for 
relevant differentia, and the resultant findings about the feature of bringing to birth 
many offspring at once. I conclude by considering whether there is any way to include 
monstrous birth in Aristotle’s science through the idea that “the way is prepared by 
nature” (GA 4.4, 770b4) for them. 
 
2. Scientific explanations of natural phenomena 
The APo provides a paradigmatic account of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) in terms of 
necessary demonstrations where the middle term picks out the cause of the necessary 
relationship between a subject and its per se attribute (e.g. APo 1.13, 2.1-2).2 This 
model is refined in order to accommodate biological knowledge.3 Aristotle also 
distinguishes three types of events and explanations of them. First, there is absolute 
necessity, which holds always—encompassing eternal cyclic processes (GC 2.11, 
337b30-8a18). Next, there are those things that hold only for the most part, including 
the objects of biological science. Finally, there are incidental events, which we think of 
as the result of chance or luck. 
 
There is no understanding through demonstration of what holds by chance. For what 
holds by chance is neither necessary nor for the most part, but what comes about apart 
from these; and demonstration is for one or other of these. For every deduction is either 
through necessary or through for the most part propositions; and if the propositions are 
necessary, the conclusion is necessary too; and if for the most part, the conclusion too is 
                                                          
2 See also Lennox 2001b: 128-31. 
3 Lennox 2001b: 128-31; Leunnisen 2010: 43-5. 
 
 
such. Hence, if what happens by chance is neither for the most part nor necessary, there 
will not be demonstration of it (APo 1.30, 87b19-26. trans. after ROT; cf. APo 2.13, 96a7-
11). 
 
Events occurring due to chance, such as monsters, are immune to scientific knowledge 
but natural events that happen “for the most part” can be demonstrated and known.4 
One important resource for understanding the flexible and complex model of scientific 
explanation is a distinction between causal and modal uses of necessity (APo 2.12). 
Causal necessity in sublunary natural objects is conditional necessity.5 In sublunary 
phenomena, the relationship between the subject and its attribute is not absolute but 
conditional and the middle term is an expression of teleological causation (PA 1.1, 
640a1-9, 33-b3). Modal necessity is the idea that the relationship between cause and 
effect is not absolute but only occurs for the most part—which is particularly useful in 
the investigations in biology where internal and external material factors can impede 
goal-directed natural processes in particular instances (PA 1.1, 639b29-31, GA 4.8, 
777a18-21).  
Finally, demonstrations require starting points in the form of axioms and posits (APo 
1.2), which are further subdivided into suppositions and definitions. Definitions will 
state the essence of kinds (APo 1.10). The search for definitions is evident in many parts 
of the zoology,6 as is the search for essential characteristics of animals. Aristotle looks 
for features of animals that occur regularly together so that in a second stage of analysis, 
he can attempt to discover if there is any necessary (in modal sense) link between the 
features.7 Devin Henry (2015: 172-174) helpfully classifies three types of “for the most 
part” (FMP) propositions found in the biological works. Category A1: ceteris paribus 
laws; Category A2: the more and the less; and Category B: correlation without causation. 
A1 expresses a defeasibility condition; for example, if females FMP do not menstruate 
when lactating, this means they do not unless material factors intervene or impede what 
                                                          
4 See also Henry 2015: 171. 
5 The distinction was recently brought into focus by Kupreeva 2010 and refined by Leunissen 
2010a: 46-50. 
6 In particular in the HA and PA but also in the GA. See his attempts to define male and female 
(GA 1.21, 729b8-19, 766a31-4). 
7 See Henry and Nielsen 2015: 6, and Henry 2011: 211-12. 
 
 
normally occurs (GA 4.4, 777a3-21). A2 expresses the fact that some natural features 
are plastic but tend to cluster in one area—so that although dogs FMP begin to lactate 
five days after birth, it is natural for them to do this between four and seven days after 
(HA 6.20, 574b6-7). B-type cases are ones in which sometimes FMP propositions are 
merely “observable regularities” with no underlying causal basis, such as the correlation 
of having many toes with producing many offspring (GA 4.4, 771b2-8). The most 
straightforward type is A1, which can be used in scientific demonstrations, since 
propositions of this type can be easily reformulated so as to hold in every case (e.g. “all 
normal pregnant female animals necessarily lactate if nothing impedes”).8 A2 cases are 
more difficult since just because something happens FMP in this way does not mean 
that cases that fall outside that but within a normal range are not also natural.9 It is 
clear, though, that B-type propositions will be useless in our search for scientific 
knowledge. 
We can see, then, that biology contains modes of explanation originating in an 
Analytics-style structure, inevitably reformulated for use in the sublunary realm where 
entities are changeable and contingent. The proper knowledge of them requires that we 
find the links between the per se attributes of entities in order to come up with 
informative demonstrations.  
 
3. Aristotle on monsters and deformed kinds in GA 4.4 
In this section, Aristotle concentrates on (i) monsters which are two animals grown 
together, like conjoined twins; (ii) deformities that involve redundancy of parts—one 
animal with parts of two or more; and (iii) deformities that involve deficiency of parts. 
The section is well crafted to discuss these three types of monstrous birth, linking them 
through a common set of causes. It ends with the related issue of superfetation, which is 
also the result of similar causes.   
Aristotle seeks a demonstration using the same cause for various phenomena 
surrounding the generative processes, in particular instances including sexual 
differentiation, hereditary resemblances, and monstrosities (GA 4.3, 769b3-9). It is clear 
from the earlier part of GA 4 that one of the main causes in the case of sexual 
                                                          
8 Henry (2015) 183-4  
9 Ibid, 184 attempts to reformulate FMP propositions of type A2 through another essential 
feature. 
 
 
differentiations and heredity is the state of the mixture of the male and female 
generative residues. In GA 4.4, a broad statement of the importance of συμμετρία, due 
proportion (767a14-35), is followed by an intricate exposition of what goes on in this 
mixture. An individual animal comes to be male or female and to resemble its relatives 
in certain parts and features due to the δυνάµεις and the κινήσεις derived from these 
battling it out (GA 4.3, 767b21-768b15). And when everyone loses (including ancestoral 
κινήσεις reached by relapse), nothing is left to shape the animal appropriately and so it 
is a monster (GA 768b27-9). After a confusion of shaping κινήσεις all that is left is just 
an animal, not recognizable as a particular kind (GA 4.3, 769b13).  
Initially, in GA 4.4, Aristotle rejects the idea that deformity is due to the exclusively 
male semen (76931-770a5), opting instead for the view that the problems occur “in the 
fetations (κυήμασι) as they become established” (770a8). Fetations are a combination 
of male and female contributions to generation; the same causes determine how this 
mixture will turn out (GA 4.3, 769b4), an idea further elaborated as the proportional 
relationship between the two residues with appropriate levels of complementary 
δυνάµεις (GA 4.4, 772a2-30).10 The fetation is where the problem occurs, but in GA 4.3 
the explanations that Aristotle reaches for do not only involve the intricacies of that 
mixture but instead broaden out to consider the type of animal in which these problems 
occur and the generative processes in them, linking these to other aspects of their 
nature.  
In seeking the cause for these three types of problem birth, Aristotle begins to focus 
on one particular feature of certain animals—the propensity to produce more than one 
offspring per birth or polyparity.11 The most polyparous of all are the many-toed 
(πολυσχιδής) kind. 
 
[Monstrosities occur] more frequently in goats and sheep, because they are polyparous; 
and still more frequently in the many-toed, because these animals are polyparous and the 
offspring is not perfected when born (e.g., the dog)—most of these animals’ young, of 
                                                          
10 This passage more specifically explains why many offspring can be produced at once. 
11 Aristotle appears to distinguish the production of many offspring per birth (πολυτοϰία) from 
the production of many offspring over a lifetime (πολυγονία, which we might call “profilicacy”), 
although the terms are somewhat fluid in the HA. Birds have both features (GA 3.1); they are 
polyparous because they produce eggs with two yolks (GA 4.4, 770a14-16). 
 
 
course, are born blind. The cause why this occurs and the cause why they are prolific must 
be stated later. But the way to the production of monstrosities has been already prepared 
by nature (προωδοποίηται τῇ φύσει) by the fact that they generate offspring which, 
owing to its imperfect state, is unlike its parents (GA 4.4, 770a36-b5, trans. after Peck). 
 
In this most unusual phrase, “the way has been prepared by nature,” Aristotle links the 
animal’s nature, its characteristic way of life, to the more frequent occurrence of 
monstrous birth in it. If, as Aristotle insists elsewhere, monstrous birth is contrary to 
nature, how can it be that nature has prepared for it? Aristotle continues as follows: 
 
A monstrosity belongs to class contrary to nature not in its entirety but only to nature in 
the generality of cases (τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ). So far as concerns the nature which is 
always, and is by necessity, nothing occurs contrary to that; no, unnatural occurrences are 
found only among those things which occur as they do in the generality of cases, but 
which may occur otherwise (GA 4.4, 770b9-13, trans. after Peck). 
 
This statement makes a familiar point, reminding us of the contrast between absolute 
and modal necessity in the sublunary realm, where teleological ends can be impeded 
and connections are defeasible. There is nothing here yet to explain why nature itself is 
involved in preparing for a monstrous birth. It is only through the next statement that 
we are further enlightened.   
 
Even in those instances of the phenomena we are considering, what occurs is contrary to 
this particular order, certainly, but it never happens in a merely random fashion (μὴ 
τύχοντως); and therefore it seems less of a monstrosity (ἧττον εἶναι δοκεῖ τέρας) because 
even that which is contrary to nature is, in a way, in accordance with nature, that is, 
whenever the formal nature has not gained control over the material nature.12 Hence, 
people do not call things of this sort monstrosities any more than they do in the other 
cases where something occurs habitually (εἴωθε) […]. Thus, there is a certain sort of 
vine—“smoky” is the name some people give it; and if it bears black grapes they do not 
reckon it as a monstrosity, because it often and habitually does this (GA 4.4, 770b13-22, 
trans. after Peck). 
 
                                                          
12 Phys. 2.8, 199a31: nature is twofold, matter and form. 
 
 
Because it is natural for the many-toed to produce offspring that are incomplete, this 
means that in some cases monsters are not “by chance.” In the first line, Aristotle refers 
to “the phenomena we are considering,” and at the end of this passage back to the 
monstrous conjoined offspring (GA 4.4, 770b25), and so is indicating that these 
monsters are part of the natural order in some way. He does not simply use the idea 
that natural processes are defeasible and inexplicably go wrong every once in a while. 
This would, in fact, allow him to give a statistical account of why monsters occur more 
in the polyparous. Say that a monster occurs once in every 5000 births—if the 
monoparous elephant ends up producing only one offspring, then it is much less likely 
to have a monster (a one in 5000 chance) than an animal which produces 100 offspring 
in its lifetime (a one in 50 chance).13 But Aristotle does not say this. Instead, he is 
interested in the characteristics of this sort of animal and how it reproduces. The 
reasons for increased frequency of monstrous birth begin with polyparity; when 
compared with prolificacy on its own, it presents an extra risk factor as the many 
internal offspring can hamper each other’s completion, confusing the usual κινήσεις in 
development (GA 4.4, 770b28).14  The many-toed also add another challenge, that is, 
their relative lack of vital heat. This means that the female parent is unable to complete 
the offspring at the point of birth (GA 4.4, 770b4-5), making their growth onto each 
other even more likely (GA 4.4, 774b10-17).15  
Aristotle next expands the discussion to include two other closely related birth 
defects—the production of redundant parts and a deficiency in parts, both of which are 
also in some sense caused by polyparity (GA 4.4, 770b28, 771a14). Rather than a focus 
on what happens in all instances of generation, where the state of the mixture can lead 
to a confusion or weakening of the formative powers, the emphasis here is on the 
conditions of conception and gestation in particular types of animal. In order to tie all 
                                                          
13 This explanation would, in fact, be more appropriate to apply to all prolific animals, whether 
polyparous or not. 
14 Aristotle does not explain the absence of the sorts of membranes between offspring that he 
says at GA 2.7, 746a12-19, prevents such conjoining. 
15 This further clarification happens in GA 4.6. The heat of the female animal’s body is necessary 
to complete the offspring, suggesting that the male semen is not solely responsible for all 
differentiation of the new animal, a point I have argued elsewhere (see Connell 2016).  
 
 
these happening together Aristotle further explores the reasons for polyparity, seeking 
a firmer grounding in the animals’ natures.  
Those that suffer from the most deformities are those that have many toes and this 
was explicitly linked to polyparity. However, foot type cannot explain polyparity (GA 
4.4, 771b2-8) as the correlation is neither necessary nor sufficient. Types other than 
those with many toes are polyparous (e.g. the pig; GA 4.6, 774b24-26) and some animal 
with many toes are monoparous (e.g. the elephant; GA 4.4, 771b8-9). Furthermore, the 
frequent occurrence of the two together is a mere “observed regularity” without any 
causal basis.16 Instead, the number of offspring per birth is determined by two features 
that are fixed in the nature of animals—their size and their relative degree of vital 
heat.17 
Larger size is the reason why (διά) an animal is not polyparous—since nourishment 
is used up on bodily growth and so there is less residue to become the seminal (GA 4.4, 
771a24-5). Smaller animals, then, produce more semen and therefore can make up 
more offspring at a go. But since Aristotle rejects the idea that regions of the uterus 
draw in semen (GA 4.4, 771b27-33),18 he must explain why more generative residue 
doesn’t just produce one large embryo (as more milk and fig-juice produces a larger 
block of cheese, GA 4.4, 771b25).   
 
When animals are being perfected, there is a certain size for each, a limit of bigger and 
smaller; none will be formed bigger or smaller than these sizes […]. In precisely the same 
way, the seminal matter [i.e. the female contribution] out of it [the embryo] is formed is 
not unlimited in either direction—the amount of it can be neither bigger nor smaller than 
certain limits; the embryo cannot be formed out of any casual amount of it. Thus, in the 
case of those animals which (on account of the causes stated) discharge more residue 
than is requisite for the principle of a single animal, it is not possible that the entirety of 
this should be used to form one embryo; on the contrary, as many are formed as is 
                                                          
16 See also Henry 2015: 174. 
17 Aristotle proclaims at several points that we ought not to be amazed (θαυµάζειν, 771a19-27) 
by the correlation of parity and body size. On this correlation, see also GA 1.18, 725a28-34. On 
body size as an essential feature of a kind, see PA 4.6, 683a18-9; PA 4.9, 685b12; GA 2.6, 745a5-
9; DA 2.4, 416a15-18, IA 8, 708a9-20; and Pol. 5.9, 1309b18-35. 
18 The Pseudo-Aristotle Problemata 10.41 considers this theory, which appears in the 
Hippocratic treatise On Nature of the Child [Nat. Puer.] 31 (Potter 2012: 540) to be viable.  
 
 
determined by the sizes proper to those animals (GA 4.4, 771b33-772a8, trans. after 
Peck). 
 
Aristotle further explains, on the basis of the essential size limits of a given kind, why 
when larger animals have a good amount of generative residue, this is not divided up to 
make many offspring at once: 
 
[In] those animals which are large and produce one offspring only, a large amount of 
residue does not give rise to a large number of offspring, for the same holds good: here 
too, the amount of the material and of that which works upon it are definite (GA 4.4, 
772a30-33, trans. after Peck). 
 
We now believe that each embryo is roughly the same size—i.e. one cell/ovum. 
Aristotle, in contrast, must hold that even brand new embryos differ in size. Although 
counterintuitive to us, there is nothing theoretically implausible about such a stance, 
which explains why a large amount of generative residue only results in many offspring 
if those the parents are small-bodied. 
The same reasons lie behind deformities that involve redundant parts and those that 
involve deficient ones, i.e., the animal’s size and the amount of potent generative residue 
it produces (both male and female). In the case of redundant parts, the male and female 
have produced enough generative residue to constitute more than one offspring, but not 
enough to make it two: the materials then ooze out to form more parts than are 
required (GA 4.4, 772b13-26). About deficiency of parts, Aristotle has very little to say, 
only that they are like spontaneous abortions— presumably, in these cases there is not 
quite enough generative residue to complete the instrumental parts. The difference 
between the main cases Aristotle focuses on in GA 4.4 are then summarised: 
monstrosities are the growing together of two animals, whereas deformities involving 
redundancy are one animal with too many parts (GA 4.4, 773a8-13).       
 
4. Explanation and knowledge in GA 4.4 
This section will more closely consider three related issues in Aristotle’s explanations of 
monsters and deformities. I will begin by clarifying the role of frequent as opposed to 
rare occurrences in Aristotle’s scientific explanations. Next, I will look at Aristotle’s 
 
 
search for relevant features of kinds based on initial clues that relative frequency 
provides. Finally, I will focus on the feature of the number of offspring produced per 
birth to see how it might fit into Aristotelian science. 
Within GA 4, Aristotle is repeatedly looking for and finding causes.19 The framework 
of these causes is complex. As mentioned, it seems that one set of explanations focuses 
on the state of the mixture where Aristotle provides numerous posits (ὑποθήσεις) such 
as the presence of current (ἐνέργεια) and possible (δύναμις) potential κινήσεις,20 the 
idea that being mastered results in changing into the opposites, and the working of 
relapse (GA 4.3, 768b5-10).21 In GA 4.4, there is explicit drive to discover a 
demonstration of the causes of monstrosity (769b11). Although the state of the mixture 
is certainly still part of his explanation of monstrous birth, Aristotle focuses now more 
on animal kinds and their characteristics.  
In order to advance his knowledge of nature, Aristotle believes that he must find the 
per se attributes that attach to a natural subject through teleological reasoning. For 
example, in order for a person to be healthy, certain states of affairs must hold; these 
states of affairs are conditionally necessary for her health (PA 1.1, 639b30-40a1). This 
holds “for the most part” as it is a sublunary phenomenon and so defeasible. Finding 
items that hold together “for the most part” (FMP) is an important first step in 
attempting to discover more fundamental connections and explanatory per se attributes 
of a kind. But something’s happening frequently or rarely is no guarantee of such 
discoveries. There is no necessary connection between frequent occurrences and 
natural teleological ones in Aristotle’s science.22 Some events that happen infrequently 
are still be natural, such as the birth of a human child. Such occurrences fit with a 
“conditional frequency” model—under given conditions, things will happen for the most 
part in a certain manner.23 Although it is rare, a woman who has a child will FMP have a 
                                                          
19 E.g. GA 4.1, 766a18; 4.1, 766b26; 4.2, 767a14-5; 4.3, 768b16; 4.3, 769a1; 4.3, 769b3; and 4.3, 
769b11. 
20 For an explanation of my preferred translation, see Connell 2016: 311-12, 316, 319, and 322. 
21 The section on sexual differentiation also lists a series of premises (ὑποκειµένων, GA 4.1, 
766a16), which must be accepted before the reader can understand the causes of male and 
female coming to be. 
22 See Judson 1995: 86, 97. 
23 Ibid. 89. 
 
 
human child. Even when we have narrowed down such FMP propositions, there are still 
cases where the relevant causal connections are missing. I propose that Aristotle is well 
aware that correlations between events or features of a kind are not necessary or 
sufficient to count as properly explanatory but could be an indication or sign of these 
and so are worth investigated further. He can then get to work testing each until he can 
fix on the best and most scientific explanation and one that could ultimately feature in 
demonstrations.  Those FMP correlations that turn out to be more promising will 
require careful specification, in terms of both the plasticity of the feature and those 
factors which can impede or prevent it. Returning, then, to Henry’s 3 Categories of FMP 
propositions, we can apply these to Aristotle’s investigations in GA 4.3 to see how far he 
gets. 
FMP correlations will initially guide Aristotle in his attempts to bring to light which 
features of a kind are essential to it and so appropriate for defining kinds and providing 
scientific explanations. In GA 4.4, type of feet might at first have looked promising. 
Those that are prone to produce deformed offspring tend to be polyparous and almost 
all of the many-toed are polyparous. Having many toes24 is correlated with other 
differences in the biological corpus, such as the shape of the spleen (PA 3.12, 674a1) 
and the absence of horns and hucklebones (PA 3.12, 674a1, HA 2.1, 499b23, and PA 
4.10, 690a24). However, a focus on feet is a false start: although many toes and 
polyparity tend to occur with great frequency together, they are not causally related. 
Furthermore, no proper explanation can be attained by leaving the matter at the fact of 
polyparity. Having more offspring at a go only occurs because more generative residues 
are produced and this abundance of residues is not there for the sake of polyparity. It is, 
rather, a material consequence of the size and body heat of the kind which results in the 
production of plentiful and potent residues. The residues themselves are telic but the 
amount is contingent on many other factors, such as external weather conditions. 
                                                          
24 This is a division within the blooded and viviparous kind. Cf. HA 2.1, 499b6-11: Of blooded 
and viviparous quadrupeds some have the foot cloven into many parts, as is the case with 
humans […] (for some animals are many-toed, as the lion, the dog, and the leopard); others have 
feet cloven in two, and instead of nails have hooves, as the sheep, the goat, the deer, and the 
hippopotamus; other are uncloven, such as the solid-hoofed animals, the horse and the mule 
(trans. after Peck). See also HA 2.10, 502b34; PA 4.10, 690a5-7. 
 
 
So neither foot type nor polyparity are of much use on their own in this search for 
knowledge. In a later work in Aristotle’s school, the Problems, the author starts 
immediately with body size as the essential factor to consider with respect to the issue, 
asking “why is it that quadrupeds of a small size most often give birth to monstrosities, 
whereas man and the larger quadrupeds, such as horses and asses, do so less often?”25 
The tentative reply features both sets of causes considered in GA 4.4, polyparity and the 
confusion of seminal fluids.26 Although there is an overlap here in the content of GA 4.4 
and the Problems, there are also significant differences. In the GA, Aristotle is not 
merely speculating about whether there is a connection between certain deformities 
and polyparity—we find instead a more systematic attempt to explain this connection. 
Aristotle’s focus on body size and relative degree of vital heat fixes the explanations to 
the animal’s essence.  The combination of these two factors gives the reasons why the 
animal has the number of offspring it does per birth. Smaller size and a high level of 
vital heat makes it that a great deal of potent generative residue goes to make up many 
smallish embryos and the heat ensures that they grow and develop properly.   
The fact of polyparity is not an essential feature and so it does not appear to be 
explanatory. It is not conditionally necessary; it does not happen for the sake of 
anything coming about because body size and vital heart interact in a particular manner 
in the process of generation. As this, it is the result of two such crucial features; 
however, it occurs with enough regularity to indicate naturalness and a loose 
connection to the kind in question. 
We might at this point profitably consider how the correlations Aristotle has so far 
discovered fare in terms of the requirements for adequate demonstration proposed by 
Devin Henry.27 Size and degree of vital heat are most promising features of kinds. An 
elephant is FMP large (unless something impedes). Meanwhile, a human being FMP has 
a high degree of vital heat (unless something impedes). Bodily size and degree of vital 
heat are clearly excellent features for Aristotle to concentrate on in his biological 
explanations. As for number of offspring per birth, the answer is more complicated. 
Although it is not essential to a kind, it may still be feasible to use it in scientific 
explanations, since it is fixed within certain limits. This is because it can be tied causally 
                                                          
25 Problems 10.61, 898a9. 
26 Problems 10.61, 898a10-15. 
27 Henry 2015. 
 
 
to size and degree of vital heat. Thus, size is FMP correlated to the number of offspring 
per birth. The connection is defeasible due to fluctuations in the amount of generative 
residue produced but this in turn can be fixed with reference to the degree of vital heat 
FMP possessed by the animal kind. This means that the number of offspring per birth 
will often be fixed for a kind. So, for example, an elephant will FMP produce enough 
generative residue to generate one elephantine embryo. For some kinds, however, this 
is not the case. For human beings in particular, it is more difficult to fix how many 
offspring they will produce per birth, as the FMP propositions associated with twinning 
are more like Henry’s A2. This may help to explain why Aristotle seems not to have 
made up his mind about whether human twinning is natural or not. 
Sometimes Aristotle says that for humans having twins counts as a monstrous birth 
and that having one offspring is most natural to them (GA 4.4, 772a36-772b1). He also 
says that human dualize (ἐπαµφοτερίζει), sometimes producing one and sometimes 
more than one offspring per birth (GA 4.4, 772b1-3);28 it would seem that both are 
natural to humans. It might even be the case that “humans are by nature polyparous” 
(GA 4.5, 773b23-24).  Certainly human twinning is rare but this need not make it 
unnatural. Henry’s A2 FMP phenomena do not necessarily pick out the only natural 
happenings within a more or less continuum. It is natural for a dog to lactate seven days 
after birth, even if FMP dogs lactate after five. So also it may well be natural for a human 
to have twins even if FMP humans do not do so. After all, they have a good level of vital 
heat and so are full of residues (GA 4.4, 772a36) and have a roomy enough uterus (GA 
4.5, 773b24), all features which are perfectly natural to them.29 On the other hand, 
Aristotle might choose to limit the range of what counts as natural in this case, unlike 
the dog case, specifying that one offspring is what is natural (GA 4.4, 772b3). His 
decision will no doubt be based on other factors he takes to be relevant. He might, for 
example, consider the places and sorts of human beings that more regularly produce 
twins and decide that they are unnatural and freakish.30 
                                                          
28 See also mules and deer (HA 6.22, 576a1; HA 6.29, 578b15). 
29 Another feature of human beings also aids multiple pregnancy, that is, their variable 
gestational period (GA 4.4, 772b8-10). An animal’s gestational period is said to be proper to it 
(οἰκεῖος) indicating that it is likely to be a part of its essence (GA 4.3, 769b25).   
30 Aristotle believes that people living in places other than Greece are somehow defective (Pol. 
7.7, 1327b29-28a14).  Twins occur most in Egypt (GA 4.4, 770a35, HA 9(7).4, 584b31-32). 
 
 
Returning, then, to the number of offspring per birth as a feature of a given animal 
type—it can be fixed by nature, at least for some animals.  The fact that it is natural can 
then make better sense of two anatomical facts. Polyparous animals will need larger 
uteri and more numerous nipples, and nature does appear to supply them with these.31 
The size of the uterus would seem to be fixed by nature to suit the size of the offspring. 
Although one could argue that this is not the case, given that it initially comes to be in 
order to contain the female generative residue (GA 4.1, 766b23-25), with no mention of 
gestation. Indeed, some uteri would seem to always be a bit too big, such as those in 
animals that superfetate. These animals have left over space in their uteri even after 
there is an embryo in it (GA 4.5, 773b24). Even if the size of the uterus is variable, it 
does appear that the number of nipples an animal has is not (PA 4.10, 688a31-b25). 
 
Polyparous animals have their mammae upon the abdomen. This is because they have 
numerous young to feed, and so they need numerous mammae (PA 4.10, 688b15-17). 
 
We can now establish the relevant sense in which polyparity is natural to a kind and 
subject to scientific understanding. It is not directly teleological but connected through 
essential features of the kind. It is more variable and plastic than other features, 
fluctuating depending on a number of factors such as time of life and locality. It comes 
along with essential features, in particular body size and amount of vital heat, which 
then results in abundant and potent generative residues.  This, again combined with 
small body size, means that many embryos can make a start in the uterus all at once. 
One might think of it as a feature that follows the pattern of secondary teleology, where 
nature uses material conditions to further its aims.32 This seems to be plausible, since 
one of the goals of nature will be for each individual to reproduce itself as many times as 
is possible.33 However, one might be reluctant to characterise this feature as so closely 
tied to teleology since it leads to detrimental results, i.e. an increased risk of severe 
deformities.   
                                                          
31 Even though a small uterus will be able to contain many undeveloped embryos there would 
seem to have to be some natural mechanism to prevent more than the viable number forming 
there, some “foresight” about how large the embryos will eventually get. 
32 On “secondary teleology,” see Leunissen 2010: chapter 4. 
33 Connell 2016: 240-43. 
 
 
Can any monstrous birth, if regular and explicable in terms of animal kind and 
process of generation, fit into Aristotle’s natural science? The best chance for this is 
those conjoined offspring that most frequently occur in the many-toed kind. In these 
cases “the way is prepared by nature” which means those monsters are “not by chance” 
(GA 4.4, 770b15). Aristotle suggests, then, that the conjoining of twins in the many-toed 
kind is “not monstrous”, just as black grapes on the co-called smoky vine aren’t (GA 4.4, 
770b20).34 If they are not really monstrous, then it may be that we can find a proper 
scientific explanation for them.  The way he seems to try to do this is through the idea 
that the monstrosity of the offspring is somehow a part of the nature of the kind – 
because they produce monstrous offspring almost all the time.  In the many-toed their 
offspring are never complete and so are deformed already before the growing together 
even happens.  “The way is prepared by nature” for monstrous births in this kind 
because due to middling vital heating capacities, they never complete offspring, which 
are born “deformed,” i.e. unarticulated (GA 4.6, 774b10-17).35  
If this is how Aristotle wants to include deformity within natural explanations, then 
he is going to find this a difficult position to maintain. Indeed, it does not fit well with his 
overall teleology, which makes it very difficult to see how enforcing systematic 
deformity could be a part of nature. Rather, nature always attempts to achieve what is 
best and in kinds like the many-toed, its systematic failure is not natural or part of the 
natural order. This is the way that we can make best sense of Aristotle’s deformed 
kinds, as has been argued recently by Charlotte Witt.36 Looking particularly at aquatic 
quadrupeds, lobsters, moles, and females37, Witt concludes that to be deformed for 
Aristotle is the impeded development of a part in embryogenesis. This results in an 
animal with a part that is (i) incomplete and therefore not functional or (ii) not used for 
                                                          
34 Nielsen 2008: 394 provides an interesting interpretation of this passage. For her, Aristotle is 
arguing against the common view that black grapes are not monstrous; instead he thinks they 
are, just like female births. 
35 See also HA 6.33, 580a4-5; GA 2.6, 742a1.   
36 Witt 2012. 
37 Allan Gotthelf (1985: 39-41) gives a different account of deformity of kinds, where the kind is 
deformed relative to the wider kind to which it belongs.  
 
 
its proper function.38 So the mole has eyes that are incomplete and non-functional, 
while the seal and lobster use parts for roles they are not designed for (the seal 
swimming with a walking instrument and the lobster walking with a grasping 
instrument).39 This account avoids the difficulty of having a teleologically focused form 
that is systematically producing defective animals, instead positing that the errors occur 
in the process of embryological development in each instance. This makes better sense 
of the term “ὥσπερ” used of the deformity of such animals—they are like animals that 
are deformed in the process of generation in other kinds—like the blind infant, whose 
eyes never developed properly. A potential difficulty for this theory is that quite a few 
non-deformed animal kinds are said to use their instrumental parts for dual functions.  
So the elephant uses it “nostril” as a hand (PA 2.16, 659a1), and this is because, unlike 
other quadrupeds, who use their front feet as hands, the elephant cannot do so due to 
its weight. As Aristotle says, nature in this case is following her wanted plan of using one 
and the same part for several purposes, for in the many-toed quadrupeds the fore feet 
are intended not merely to support the weight of the body, but to serve as hands (PA 
2.16, 659a21-25; cf. PA 4.10, 687b1 and 688a2-5).40 Although there may be challenges 
with applying case (ii), case (i)41 seems very apt and applies well in the case of the 
many-toed kind. Rather than the production of unarticulated animals being a part of 
                                                          
38 The Greek terms used for deformity are often used of people without limbs, who then might 
have to use other limbs in order to complete daily tasks. See Witt 2012: 90-91.   
39 I disagree with Witt that the female is characterized by Aristotle in the same way, as lacking a 
functional part. The parts that are unfinished, defective, or used for other purposes in the seal, 
lobster, and mole are instrumental parts. For Aristotle, male and female do not fundamentally 
differ with respect to their instrumental generative parts but due to the heating action of their 
heart (GA 4.1, 766a35-b5). This is the part that forms before the rest and directs the 
development of the other parts (GA 2.6, 742a16-b18; cf. GA 4.4, 773a5-6). Any serious infirmity 
in this part would mean that the animal could not develop at all. For further discussion, see 
Connell 2016: chapter 8.  
40 See also the dual function of female mammaries (PA 4.10, 688a16ff; and b24-25) and the 
octopuses use of an arm as a penis (HA 4.1, 524a8-10). 
41 This type of deformity, a deficiency of the parts (770b30; 772b37-773a2), is the one that 
Aristotle has the least to say about in particular instances in GA 4.4. This is probably because 
these embryos are much less likely to survive, particularly if the part that is deficient is a 
controlling part. They are often spontaneously aborted (GA 4.4, 773a1-2). 
 
 
their form or nature, it is rather the case that their form systematically fails to establish 
itself in order to complete the offspring at the point of birth. And there is nothing 
natural about this. Thus, there isn’t any way in which the deformities are natural or 
subject to any natural teleological explanation based on per se causes. Instead, the 
explanation will be in terms of material factors, divorced from essence; it will concern 
the state of the mixture of generative residues. We can conclude, therefore, that though 
conjoined offspring occur more often in the many-toed, this does not make them less 
monstrous but only makes it seem that they less so. Why he says that they are “not by 
chance” remains a mystery. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In investigating the causes of monstrous births, Aristotle seeks some kind of 
demonstration (GA 4.3, 769b4). Moving away from only focusing on the mechanisms at 
play in the mixture of generative residues, he broadens his analysis to consider the 
types of animals involved and the features that are essential to them and explanatory of 
their essence. In doing so, he might indeed be getting closer to demonstrative scientific 
knowledge. By seeking to further investigate observed regularities, we can see Aristotle 
trying to find out which will move us toward scientific knowledge and which will not. 
The explanatory framework he settles on provides a backdrop upon which the scientist 
can situate the occurrence of monstrous birth. So, although she cannot provide any 
demonstrations of why it happens, since it is anomalous, incidental and unnatural, she 
can see when it is more likely to happen based on her knowledge of the various kinds of 
animals and their essential features. By tying it to essential feature, Aristotle can then 
give an account a feature that has strong connections to the relevant natural processes. 
This feature is polyparity, a feature that most often creates the possibility for the sorts 
of monsters and deformities he is most interested in. Polyparity is the cause of these 
happenings but since it is not essential, it cannot be linked in the proper manner to the 
animal kinds in which it occurs, and probably cannot feature as a premise in a scientific 
demonstration. However, since Aristotle regards it as a pretty stable feature of a kind, 
piggy-backing on essential features and the regularity of the workings of internal and 
external material necessity, is can count as “natural.” It is tied closely enough to the 
animal’s nature for other anatomical features to be in place such as a given number of 
nipples and a spacious uterus.   
 
 
One could see polyparity as in some ways similar to other features Aristotle discusses 
in GA 4 and 5, specifically inherited features and accidental ones. Inherited features 
follow particular patterns determined by the κινήσεις in the parents’ generative 
residues.  When you end up looking like your mother, the κινήσεις won’t change into 
any chance thing (οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, GA 768a3) but only into the opposite of the father. 
Although they are not present for the sake of anything, we can think of them as “per se 
results of certain κινήσεις, which are said to be drawn from potentials that the 
generator has non-accidentally, qua generator.”42 We might also here bring to mind the 
accidental features from GA 5 (e.g. eye color).  Owls have to have eyes constructed in a 
particular manner from particular material (conditional necessity) in order to see 
acutely. The color that results from those materials conditions is not part of the essence 
(GA 5.1, 778a33, and 779a30-31) but will invariably appear. The pattern of consistent 
eye color following from an animal’s essence is similar to the consistency with which 
polyparity follows from essential features.43   
In the case of number of offspring per birth, it would seem that natural causes 
underlie and make it so that although these are not per se causes (not intended 
directly), nature (like deliberation) can somehow predict that these concurrences will 
happen and in a way intend them.44 What nature, however, can never intend is any 
increased likelihood of monsters and deformity. So although they can be predicted, 
monsters are the result of pure chance.  There is a natural grounding for them but we 
cannot have any proper knowledge of monstrosity itself other than that it involves the 
absence of teleology (GA 4.10, 778a5-9).45 And so we are forced to return to the messy 
                                                          
42 Gelber 2010: 191. See also Connell 2016: 320-1. 
43 In the case of eye colour, however, the colour itself is non-teleological.  Many offspring per 
birth, on the other hand, can find a connection to the goal of generation. 
44 Allen 2015:  “It seems conceivable that there could be cases in which by doing one thing per 
se one could hardly fail to do something else per accidens, as a concomitant. Elsewhere, of 
course, Aristotle is happy to allow that a substance is always and necessarily attended by some 
of its accidents (Meta. 1024a3-4; APo 75b1) […] to the well informed agent, they come as no 
surprise, and they are part of what he does intentionally even if not with the intention of 
bringing them about” (79). 
45 Johnson 2005: 198. 
 
 
details of what occurs in the mixture of male and female generative residues in each 
particular instance of generation (GA 4.3, 768b28-35) in order to seek reasons for them. 
